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Abstract 
This paper computes welfare-maximizing Taylor-style interest rate rules, in a business cycle 
model of a two-country world. The model assumes staggered price setting, violations of the 
Law of One Price, due to pricing-to-market, and productivity shocks, as well as shocks to the 
uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition--these shocks can be interpreted as reflecting 
biased exchange rate forecasts by "noise traders". Optimized policy rules closely replicate the 
equilibrium under price flexibility. Monetary policy coordination (joint maximization of 
world welfare) yields very limited welfare gains, compared to the Nash outcome. UIP shocks 
have a non-negligible negative effect on welfare, especially when these shocks are highly 
persistent, and when trade linkages between the two countries are strong. The adoption of an 
exchange rate peg may thus be welfare improving, if the adoption of the peg reduces the 
variance of the UIP shocks. The model explains thus the propensity of very open economies 
to peg their exchange rate vis-à-vis their main trading partners. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper studies the effects of monetary policy rules on welfare and business cycles, using a  
model of a two-country world. The model assumes staggered price setting, departures from 
the Law of One Price (due to pricing-to-market),  physical capital, and incomplete 
international  financial markets (bonds-only) . There are productivity shocks, as well as a 
shock to the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition (that can be interpreted as reflecting 
biased exchange rate forecasts by "noise traders").  
 Monetary policy in each country is described by a rule according to which the interest 
rate is set as a function of a GDP and of price inflation. The model is solved using Sims' 
(2000) new solution technique that is based on a second-order expansion of the equilibrium 
conditions. Existing normative studies on monetary policy regimes in open economies mostly 
use highly stylized models for which exact closed form solutions can be derived (e.g., Corsetti 
and Pesenti (2001), Devereux and Engel (2000), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001));  the 
simplifying assumptions made in these models include, in particular: full international risk 
sharing, and the absence of physical capital. The technique used here allows to dispense with 
these restrictive assumptions.   
In the economy considered here, optimized policy rules closely replicate the 
equilibrium under price flexibility. Monetary policy coordination (joint maximization of 
world welfare) yields very limited welfare gains, compared to the Nash outcome—this is the 
case even when trade linkages between the two countries are strong. Exchange rate volatility 
induced by UIP shocks may be highly detrimental to welfare, especially under strong trade 
linkages. An exchange rate peg may be welfare improving, if the peg reduces the variance of 
the UIP shocks.  
Section 2 of this paper presents the model and discusses the solution method, Section 
3 presents the results and Section 4 concludes.  
 
 
2. The model 
A two-country world is considered. In each country there are firms, a representative 
household and a central bank (the structure of preferences and technologies follows 
Kollmann, 2002, 2001a). Each country produces a single non-tradable final good and a 
continuum of tradable intermediate goods indexed by s[0,1]. The final good sector is 
perfectly competitive. Each country's final good is produced from domestic and imported 
intermediate goods; the final good is consumed and used for investment. There is 
monopolistic competition in intermediate goods markets. Intermediate goods producers use 
domestic capital and labor as inputs (capital and labor are immobile internationally). In each 
country, the household owns all domestic producers and the capital stock, which it rents to 
producers. It also supplies labor. The markets for rental capital and for labor are competitive.  
Preferences and technologies are symmetric across the countries. Foreign variables are 
denoted by an asterisk. The following description focuses on the Home country.  
 
2.1. Final good production  
The Home final good is produced using the aggregate technology 
                                        1/ ( 1) / 1/ ( 1) / /( 1){( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) }d d m mt t tZ Q Q
            ,                            (1) 
with d , m >0,  d + m =1,  >0. tZ  is final good output at date t; 
d
tQ , 
m
tQ  are quantity 
indices of domestic and imported intermediate goods, respectively: 
 3 
1 ( 1) / /( 1)
0
{ ( ) }t
i
tQ q s ds
ν ν ν ν− −
= ∫i  with 1ν > , for i=d,m, where ( )dt sq  and ( )mt sq  are quantities of the 
domestic and imported type s intermediate goods. Let ( )dt sp  and ( )
m
t sp  be the prices of these 
goods in Home currency. Cost minimization in Home final good production implies: 
                          ( ) ( ( ) / )t tt ts s P Qq p
ν−
=
i i i i ,    ( / )t t t tQ P P Z
ϑα −=i i i    for i=d,m,                            (2) 
                       with 
1 1 1/(1 )
0
{ ( ) }t tP s dsp
ν ν− −
= ∫ ii ,    1 1 1/(1 ){ ( ) ( ) }d d m mt t tP P Pϑ ϑ ϑα α− − −= + .                (3) 
d
tP  [
m
tP ]  is a price index for domestic [imported] intermediate goods that are sold in the 
Home market. Perfect competition implies that the price of the Home final good is tP  (its 
marginal cost is  1 1 1/(1 ){ ( ) ( ) }d d m mt tP P
ϑ ϑ ϑα α− − −+ ).  
 
2.2. Intermediate goods firms  
The technology of the firm that produces intermediate good  s in the Home country  is:  
                                            1( ) ( ) ( )t t t ty s K s L s
ψ ψθ −= ,   0 1ψ< < .                                          (4) 
( )ty s  is the firm's output at date t; tθ  is an exogenous productivity parameter that is identical 
for all Home intermediate goods producers; ( )tK s  and ( )tL s  are the amounts of capital and 
labor used by the firm. 
Let tR  and tW  be the rental rate of capital and the wage rate. Cost minimization 
implies: 1( )/ ( ) (1 ) /t t t tL s K s R Wψ ψ−= − . The firm's marginal cost is: 
1 1(1/ ) (1 )t t t tMC R W
ψ ψ ψ ψθ ψ ψ− − −= − . 
 The firms good is sold in the domestic market and exported: ( ) ( )d mt t ty q s q s
∗
= + , 
where ( )dtq s  [ ( )
m
tq s
∗ ]   is domestic [export] demand. The firm faces the following export 
demand function: ( ) ( ( ) / )m m m mt tt ts s P Qq p
ν∗ ∗ ∗ − ∗
= , where mtp
∗  is the firm's export price, in terms 
of foreign currency.  
The profit of a domestic intermediate good producer, dxtπ  is:  
 ( ( ), ( )) ( ( ) ) /( ( ) / ) ( ( ) ) /( ( ) / )d m d d d d m m m mt t t t t t t t t t t t t tp s p s p s MC p s P Q e p s MC p s P Q
ν νπ ∗ − ∗ ∗ ∗ − ∗= − + − ,    (7)       
where te  is the nominal exchange rate, expressed as the Home currency price of foreign 
currency.  
Motivated by the empirical failure of the Law of One Price, and in particular by 
widespread pricing-to-market behavior (e.g., Knetter, 1993), it is assumed that intermediate 
goods producers can price discriminate between the domestic market and the export market 
( ( ) ( )d mt t tp s e p s
∗≠  is possible), and that they set prices in the currencies of their customers.  
There is staggered price setting, à la Calvo (1983): intermediate goods firms cannot 
change prices, in buyer currency, unless they receive a random "price-change signal." The 
probability of receiving this signal in any  particular  period  is  1-d,  a  constant.  Thus,  the  
mean price-change-interval is 1/(1-d). Following Yun (1996) and Erceg et al. (2000) it is 
assumed that when a firm does not receive a "price-change signal," its price is automatically 
increased at the steady state growth factor of the price level (in the buyer's country). 
(Throughout this paper, the term "steady state" refers to the deterministic steady state.) Firms 
are assumed to meet all demand at posted prices.  
Consider a Home country intermediate good producer that, at time t, sets a new price 
in the domestic market, ,
d
t tp . If no "price-change signal" is received between t and t τ+ , the 
price is ,
d
t tp
τΠ  at t τ+ , where Π  is the steady state growth factor of the domestic price level. 
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The firm sets , ,
0
{ ( , ( )) / }d xt t t t t t t tp Arg Max d E p s P
τ
τ τ
τ τ τ τ
τ
ρ π
=∞
+ + + +
=
= Π∑p p ,  where ,t t τρ +  is a pricing 
kernel (for valuing date t τ+  pay-offs) that equals the household's marginal rate of 
substitution between consumption at t and at t τ+  (see discussion below). Let 
, , ( / ) ( )
d d d
t t t t t t t tP P Q P
ν
τ τ τ τ τρ+ + + + +Ξ = . The solution of the maximization problem regarding ,dt tp  is:  
                 1, , ,
0 0
( /( 1)) ( ) ( )d d dt t t t t t t t tp d E MC d E
ν τ ν τ
τ τ τ
τ τ
ν ν
∞ ∞
− −
+ + +
= =
   
= − Π Ξ Π Ξ      ∑ ∑ .                 (8) 
Analogously, a Home intermediate good producer that gets to choose a new export price at 
date t sets that price at:  
        1, , ,
0 0
( /( 1)) ( ( ) ) / ( ( ) )m m mt t t t t t t t t tp d E MC e d E
ν τ ν τ
τ τ τ τ
τ τ
ν ν
∞ ∞
∗ ∗ − ∗ ∗ − ∗
+ + + +
= =
   
= − Π Ξ Π Ξ      ∑ ∑ ,          (9) 
where , , ( / ) ( / ) ( )
m m m
t t t t t t t t t tP P e e Q P
ν
τ τ τ τ τ τρ∗ ∗ ∗+ + + + + +Ξ =  , while ∗Π  is the steady state growth factor of 
the Foreign price level.  
The price indices dtP , 
m
tP
∗  (see (3), (6)) evolve according to: 
       1 1 11 ,( ) ( ) (1 )( )
d d d
t t t tP d P d p
ν ν ν− − −
−
= Π + − ;    1 1 11 ,( ) ( ) (1 )( )
m m m
t t t tP d P d p
ν ν ν∗ − ∗ ∗ − ∗ −
−
= Π + − .        (11) 
 
2.3. The representative household  
The preferences of the Home household are described by:  
                                                            0
0
( , )t t t
t
E U C Lβ
∞
=
∑ .                                                      (12) 
tE  denotes the mathematical expectation conditional upon complete information pertaining to 
period t and earlier. tC  and tL  are period t consumption and labor effort. 0 1β< <  is the 
subjective discount factor. U is a utility function given by:  
                                                         ( , ) ln( )t t t tU C L C L= − .                                                  (13) 
As indicated earlier, the household owns all domestic producers and accumulates 
physical capital. The law of motion of the capital stock is:  
                                                 1 1( , ) (1 )t t t t tK K K K Iφ δ+ ++ = − + ,                                          (14) 
where tI  is gross investment, 0 1δ< <  is the depreciation rate of capital, and φ  is an 
adjustment cost function: 211 12( , ) { } /t t t t tK K K K Kφ + += Φ − ,  0Φ > .  
The Home household also holds nominal one-period denominated in Home and in 
Foreign currency. In order to ensure stationarity of the dynamic equilibrium (which allows to 
solve the model using the Sims (2000) method), it is assumed that the Household bears 
financial transaction/intermediation costs that are quadratic functions of the stocks of Home 
and Foreign currency bonds, respectively. (Without these costs, the model is a version of the 
permanent income theory of consumption, and net assets and consumption are non-
stationary.)  The period t budget constraint of the Home household is:  
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 0
( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )A Bt t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tA e B A B P C I A i e B i R K s ds W Lπϕ ϕ ∗+ + + + − −+ + + + + = + + + + + +∫ .  (15) 
tA  and tB  are net stocks of Home and Foreign currency bonds that mature in period t, while 
1ti −  and 1ti
∗
−
 are the interest rates on these bonds. 211 12( ) ( / )
A d A d
t t t t tA P A Pϕ φ+ += ⋅  and 
21
1 12( ) ( / )
B d B d
t t t t t tB P B e Pϕ φ+ += ⋅    (where , 0A Bφ φ ≥ ),  are the period t financial transaction 
costs.  
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The household chooses a strategy 1 1 1 0{ , , , , }
t
t t t t t tA B K C L
=∞
+ + + =  to maximize its expected 
lifetime utility (12), subject to constraints (14) and (15) and to initial values 0 0 0, ,A B K . Ruling 
out Ponzi schemes, the following equations are first-order conditions of this decision problem: 
                                          , 1 1
1
11 { ( / )}
1 ( / )
t
t t t t tA d
t t
i E P P
A P
ρφ + ++
+
=
+ ⋅
,                                        (16) 
                                   , 1 1 1
1
11 { ( / ) ( / )}
1 ( )/
t
t t t t t t tB d
t t t
i E P P e e
B e P
ρφ
∗
+ + +
+
+
=
+ ⋅
,                               (17) 
                                       , 1 1 1 2, 1 1,1 { ( / 1 ) /(1 )}t t t t t t tE R Pρ δ φ φ+ + + += + − − + ,                               (18) 
                                                               /t t tW P C= ,                                                              (19) 
where , 1 1/t t t tC Cρ β+ += ,  1, 1 1( , ) /t t t tK K Kφ φ + += ∂ ∂ ,  2, 1 2 1 1( , ) /t t t tK K Kφ φ+ + + += ∂ ∂ . (16)-(18) are 
Euler conditions, and (19) says that the household equates its marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption and leisure to the real wage rate.  
 
2.4. Uncovered interest parity 
Taking a (log-)linear approximation (around 1 1 0t tA B+ += = )  (16) and (17) yields:  
                                        1 1 1ln( / ) ( / ) ( / )
A d B d
t t t t t t t t t tE e e i i A P B e Pφ φ∗+ + +≅ − − + .  
Because of transaction costs in bond markets (and because of the second order terms that have 
been suppressed in this (log-) linear approximation), uncovered interest parity (UIP) (i.e. the 
condition 1ln( / )t t t t tE e e i i
∗
+ = − ) does not hold in the model here. However, departures from 
UIP that are caused by transaction costs (and by second order terms) turn out to be very small, 
in the model simulations discussed below (i.a. because the values of  the adjustment cost 
parameters Aφ ,  Bφ  used below are close to zero). Given the well-documented strong and 
persistent empirical departures from UIP during the post-Bretton Woods era (e.g., Lewis, 
1995), variants of the model are explored in which the Home Euler condition for Foreign 
currency bonds (17) is disturbed by a stationary exogenous stochastic random variable, tϕ  
("UIP shock," henceforth):   
                                 , 1 1 1
1
11 { ( / ) ( / )}
1 ( )/
t
t t t t t t t tB d
t t t
i E P P e e
B e P
ϕ ρφ
∗
+ + +
+
+
=
+ ⋅
.                             (20) 
Up to a (log-)linear approximation (around 1 1 0t tA B+ += = , 1tϕ = ) (16) and (20) imply 
                          1 1 1ln( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ln( )
A d B d
t t t t t t t t t t tE e e i i A P B e Pφ φ ϕ∗+ + +≅ − − ⋅ + ⋅ − .                          (21) 
As discussed in the Appendix, tϕ  can be interpreted as reflecting a bias in the Home 
household's date t forecast of the date t+1 exchange rate, 1te + . It is assumed that Home and 
Foreign households make identical exchange rate forecastsand, thus that these forecasts 
exhibit the same biases.  
The counterparts to (16), (20) and (21), for the Foreign household are:  
 , 1 1
1
11 { ( / )}
1 ( / )
t
t t t t tB d
t t
i E P P
B P
ρφ
∗
∗ ∗ ∗
+ +∗ ∗ ∗
+
+
=
+ ⋅
,  , 1 1 1
1
1 11 { ( / )( / )}
1 /( )
t
t t t t t t tA d
t t t t
i E P P e e
A e P
ρφ ϕ
∗ ∗ ∗
+ + +∗ ∗ ∗
+
+
=
+ ⋅
,    (22) 
                        1 1 1ln( / ) /( ) ( / ) ln( )
A d B d
t t t t t t t t t t tE e e i i A e P B Pφ φ ϕ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗+ + +≅ − − ⋅ + ⋅ −                           (23) 
where tA
∗  and tB
∗  are the (net) stocks of Home- and Foreign-currency bonds held by the 
Foreign representative household.  
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(Frankel and Froot, 1989, document biases in exchange rate forecasts; structural 
models with UIP shocks have, i.a., been studied by Mark and Wu, 1998; Jeanne and Rose, 
2002; McCallum and Nelson, 1999, 2000; Taylor, 1993b.)  
 
2.5. Market clearing conditions 
Supply equals demand in intermediate goods markets because intermediate goods firms meet 
all demand at posted prices. In the Home country, market clearing for the final good, labor, 
and rental capital requires:  
                                t t tZ C I= + ,    
1
0
( )t tL L s ds= ∫ ,    10 ( )t tK K s ds= ∫ ,                                  (24) 
tZ , tL  and tK  are the supplies of the Home final good, of Home labor, and of Home rental 
capital, respectively, while 1
0
( )tL s ds∫   and 10 ( )tK s ds∫   represent total demand for Home labor 
and capital (by Home intermediate goods producers).  
 Market clearing for bonds requires:  
                                                0t tA A
∗+ = ,  0t tB B
∗+ = .                                                      (25) 
 
2.6. Monetary policy rules 
Much recent research on monetary policy regimes has focused on rules that stipulate a 
response of the interest rate to inflation and to real GDP (e.g., Taylor, 1993a, 1999). The 
following baseline rules for Home and Foreign monetary policy are considered here:  
                                 " "dt tt yi i Yπ= + Γ Π +Γ      and    " "
d
t tt yi i Yπ
∗∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
= + Γ Π +Γ                            (26) 
with " ( )/d dt tΠ = Π −Π Π , " ( ) /t tY Y Y Y= − , where 1/
d d d
t t tP P−Π =  is the growth factor of the 
Home price index of domestic intermediate goods that are sold in the Home market--(gross) 
Home domestic PPI inflation. tY  is Home real GDP. i  and Y  are the steady state Home 
nominal interest rate and steady state Home GDP, respectively. Throughout the paper, 
variables without time subscripts denote steady state values, and  ( ) /t tx x x x= −  is the relative 
deviation of a variable tx  from its steady state value, x. πΓ , yΓ , π
∗Γ  and y
∗Γ in (25) are 
parameters. Each central bank commits to setting the parameters of its policy rules at time-
invariant values.  
A Central Bank that seeks to maximize household welfare would, in general, adopt a 
feedback rule that stipulates a response of the interest rate to all current and lagged state 
variables (e.g., Clarida et al., 1999, and Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997). I focus on "simple" 
rules such as those shown in (26) because: (i) simple rules appear to capture quite well actual 
central bank behavior (e.g., Taylor, 1993a, 1999); (ii) the use simple rules facilitates 
commitment as the public can easily monitor whether central banks sticks to such rules; (iii) 
computationally, it does not seem feasible to determine the unrestricted welfare maximizing 
rule for the complex model considered here.  
 
The following policy arrangements will be considered:  
(i) A regime of  international monetary cooperation, in which the policy parameters of 
both central banks are set at the values that maximize 'world' welfare, defined as the sum of 
the unconditional expected values of Home and Foreign utility ( ( , ))t tE U C L + ( ( , ))t tE U C L
∗ ∗ . 
(ii) A Nash game in which each central bank selects the policy parameters that 
maximize the unconditional utility of 'its' household, taking as given the policy parameters of 
the other central bank.  
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(iii) An exchange rate peg. A unilateral peg and a bilateral peg will be considered. 
Under the unilateral peg, the central bank of one of the countries follows an interest rate rule  
of the type indicated in (25), and it maximizes the welfare of 'its' household, while the central 
bank of the other country pegs the nominal exchange rate. In the bilateral peg, the mean world 
interest rate is set as a function of world PPI inflation and world output:  
                                      " " " "( ) / 2 ( ) / 2 ( ) / 2d dpeg pegt t t tt t yi i i Y Yπ
∗∗∗+ = + Γ Π +Π +Γ + ,  
and the policy parameters pegπΓ  and 
peg
yΓ  are set to maximize world welfare 
( ( ( , ))t tE U C L + ( ( , ))t tE U C L
∗ ∗ ).  
 
2.7. Solution method, welfare measures 
The model is solved using Sims' (2000) second-order accurate method, and the objective 
functions of the central banks are maximized numerically with respect to the policy 
parameters (attention is restricted to parameter values for which a unique stationary 
equilibrium exists).  
A second-order Taylor expansion of the utility function around the steady state gives:  
" # "( ( , )) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t tt tE U C L U C L E C LE L Var C≅ + − − , where "( )tVar C  is the variance of " tC . 
(For the parameter values used below, L =0.74.)  
In what follows, welfare is expressed as the permanent relative change in consumption 
(compared to the steady state), ζ , that yields expected utility ( ( , ))t tE U C L : 
" # "((1 ) , ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )tt tU C L U C L E C LE L Var Cζ+ = + − − . ζ  can be decomposed into components, 
denoted mζ  and vζ , that reflect the means of consumption and hours worked, and the 
variance of consumption, respectively:  
       " #((1 ) , ) ( , ) ( ) ( )m ttU C L U C L E C LE Lζ+ = + − ,    "v((1 ) , ) ( , ) ( )tU C L U C L Var Cζ+ = − .        
(13) implies " # "ln(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )tt tE C LE L Var Cζ+ = − − , " #ln(1 ) ( ) ( )m ttE C LE Lζ+ = − , "vln(1 ) ( )tVar Cζ+ =−   
and thus v(1 ) (1 )(1 )mζ ζ ζ+ = + + . 
 
2.8. Parameters (non-policy)  
The steady state Home and Foreign real interest rates are assumed to be identical, 
(1 ) / 1 (1 ) / 1r i i∗ ∗≡ + Π − = + Π − . r is set at 0.01r = , a value that corresponds roughly to the 
long-run average return on capital. The subjective discount factor is, hence, set at 1/(1.01), 
since (1 ) 1rβ + =  holds in steady state.  
ϕ , the elasticity of substitution between (aggregate) Home and Foreign intermediate 
goods, in final good production, equals the price elasticity of  (aggregate) exports and imports 
(see (2), (5)). ϕ  is set at ϕ =1, a value in the range of  estimates of prices elasticities of 
aggregate imports and exports reported by Hooper and Marquez (1995). mα  (see (1)) is set so 
that the steady state imports GDP ratio is 10%, which corresponds roughly to the 
imports/GDP ratios of  the U.S. (A sensitivity analysis is conducted with respect to mα .)  
The steady state price-marginal cost markup factor for intermediate goods is set at 
/( 1) 1.2ν ν − = , consistent with the findings of Martins et al. (1996) for G7 countries. The 
technology parameter ψ  (see (4)) is set at 0.24ψ = , which entails a 60% steady state labor 
income/GDP ratio, consistent with data for these countries. Aggregate data suggest a quarterly 
capital depreciation rate of about 2.5%; thus, δ =0.025 is used. The capital adjustment cost  
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parameter Φ  is set at Φ =8 in order to match the fact that the standard deviation of HP 
filtered log investment is three to four times larger than that of GDP in the sample countries.  
        The transaction cost parameters for bonds are assumed to be identical across countries: 
A Bφ φ ∗= , B Aφ φ ∗= . The modified interest rate parity conditions (21), (23) and the market 
clearing condition for bonds (25) imply that, up to a (log-)linear approximation (around 
1 1 0t tA B+ += = , 1tϕ = ), the stocks of Home currency bonds and of Foreign currency bonds 
held by a given country each account for half that country's net asset position: e.g., 
1
1 12/ /
d d
t t t tA P NFA P+ +≅ ⋅  and  11 12/ /
d d
t t t t te B P NFA P+ +≅ ⋅ ,  where 1 1 1t t t tNFA A e B+ + += +  is the 
Home net foreign asset position at the end of period t (expressed in Home currency). 
Substituting these expression into (21) shows that the cross-country interest rate differential 
depends on the net foreign asset position:  
                                     11 2ln( / ) ( ) / ln( )
A B d
t t t t t t t ti i E e e NFA Pφ φ ϕ∗ +− ≅ + − + .                           (27) 
Panel regressions (for 21 OECD countries) presented by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001)  
[LMF]  show that cross-country's interest rate differential are negatively related to net foreign 
assets. In terms of the model here, this suggests that A Bφ φ< , i.e. that (loosely speaking) 
trading in own-currency bonds is less costly than trading in foreign-currency bonds. The LMF 
estimates imply that 12 ( ) 0.0019 /
A B mQφ φ ∗− = − , where is mQ ∗  is steady state Home exports 
(see discussion in Appendix). Unfortunately, the LMF study does not allow to separately 
identify Aφ  and Bφ . I set Aφ  and Bφ  at the lowest possible (non-negative) values that are 
consistent with the LMF estimate for ( )A Bφ φ− : Aφ =0, 0.0038 /B mQφ ∗= .  
 Recent estimates of  Calvo-style price setting equations suggest that in G7 economies 
the average price-change interval is about 4 quarters (e.g., Lopez-Salido (2000)). Hence, d is 
set at d=0.75. The steady state growth factors of the domestic and world price levels are set at 
1∗Π = Π = . Π  and ∗Π  have no effect on real variables, because of indexing. 
Home and Foreign productivity follow this process:  
                                      1
1
0.906 0.088ln( ) ln( )
0.088 0.906ln( ) ln( )
t t t
t t t
θ
θ
θ θ ε
θ θ ε
−
∗ ∗ ∗
−
      
= +            
,                                  (28) 
where t
θε  and t
θε ∗  are normal white noises with standard deviation 0.0085. The correlation 
between t
θε  and t
θε ∗  is 0.258. Backus et al. (1995) argue that (27) captures the time series 
behavior of total factor productivity in the U.S. and in an aggregate of European countries.  
Kollmann (2002b) constructs quarterly estimates of departures from UIP between the 
U.S: dollar and an aggregate of European currencies (Germany, France, Italy), for the period 
1973-94.  1 Previous structural models with UIP shocks have assumed that these shocks 
follow an AR(1) process (Taylor (1993), McCallum and Nelson (1999)). Fitting an AR(1) 
model to the estimated ln( )tϕ series yields:  
                                            1ln( ) 0.55ln( )t t t
ϕϕ ϕ ε
−
= + ,                                               (29) 
                                                 
1
 Let 1 1ln( / )t t t t ti i e eυ
∗
+ +≡ − − . (21) and 
Aφ =0 imply:  1 1ln( ) ( / )B dt t t t t tE B e Pυ ϕ φ+ += − ⋅ . If the term 
1( / )
B d
t t tB e Pφ +⋅  is small, then 1 ln( )t t tEυ ϕ+ ≈ , and an estimate of ln( )tϕ  can be obtained by projecting 1tυ +  
on variables in the date t information set. Kollmann (2002) constructs an estimated ln( )tϕ  series by regressing 
1tυ +  on lagged values of 1tυ + , and on current values and lags 1-4 of Home and Foreign interest rates and GDP  
(i.e. on 0,..,4{ , , , , }t s t s t s t s t s si i Y Yυ
∗ ∗
− − − − − =
).  
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where t
ϕε  is a normal white noise with standard deviation 0.0259. One set of 
simulations discussed below uses this estimated AR(1) process. (Taylor and McCallum-
Nelson use similar AR(1) parameters).2  Hence UIP shocks are rather volatile (standard 
deviation: 3.10%), and their first-order autocorrelation (0.55) is positive.  
However, it appears that this AR(1) process understates the persistence of  UIP 
shocks. The following Table reports autocorrelations of order 1,..,8τ =  of the estimated 
ln( )tϕ  series (standard errors in parentheses):  
 
τ-th order Autocorrelations of quarterly UIP shocks (US-Europe, 1973-94) 
τ     1        2       3       4        5         6        7         8        9       10       11      12      13      14      15     16 
    0.53   0.31  0.39   0.34   0.28    0.23   0.16    0.19   0.28    0.08    0.08  0.10   0.10   0.15   0.11   0.04 
     (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.05)   (0.09)  (0.12)    (0.10)   (0.11)   (0.13)   (0.16)   (0.17)    (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.15)   (0.13)   (0.14)  (0.13) 
 
 
The historical autocorrelations of order greater than 1 are all larger than the autocorrelations 
implied by an AR(1) process with a root of 0.55. 
 The following two-factor model allows to better capture the serial correlation of 
historical UIP shocks:  
                                      1ln( ) , , 0 1
a
t t t t t ta u a aϕ λ ε λ−= + = + < <                                     (30) 
where ta  and 
a
tε  are independent white noises with standard deviations  aσ  and uσ , 
respectively. In (30), the UIP shock is modeled as the sum of a serially correlated random 
variable and of an i.i.d. random variable. (30) implies that the thτ −  order autocorrelation of 
ln( )tϕ , denoted by ( )ϕρ τ  is given by: ( ) τϕρ τ λ= ϒ ,  for 1τ ≥ ,  where 
( ) / (ln( )),t tVar a Var ϕϒ =  2 2( ) /(1 )t aVar a σ λ= − . Fitting (using Non-Linear Least Squares) the 
equation ( ) τϕρ τ λ= ϒ  to the  historical autocorrelations shown in the above Table yields these 
estimates: 0.88λ =  and 0.52ϒ = . Under (30),  2(ln( )) ( )t t uVar Var aϕ σ= + . Setting (ln( ))tVar ϕ  at 
its historical value (0.0318), then pins down aσ  and uσ : 0.0120aσ =  and 0.0212uσ = . 
 
3. Results 
Tables 1-3 show the results. In these Tables, 1/t t tP P−Π =  is gross CPI (final good) inflation. 
1/t te e e −∆ =  is the depreciation factor of the nominal exchange rate. /
d d
t t tP MCµ =  and 
/m mt t t te P MCµ ∗ ∗=  are geometric averages of the markup factors of individual domestic 
intermediate goods producers in the domestic market and in the export market (e.g., 
1 1 1/(1 )
0
{ ( ) }d dt t s ds
ν νµ µ − −= ∫ , where ( ) ( ) /d dt t ts p s MCµ = ). /t t t tRER e P P∗=  is the Home real 
exchange rate. tNFA  is the Home net foreign asset position, expressed in units of Home 
consumption, and normalized by steady state GDP (expressed in units of consumption). 
                                                 
2
 Taylor (1993b) reports estimated standard deviations of UIP innovations of the U.S. vis-à-vis the 
other G7 countries that range between 0.037 and 0.101. He sets the autocorrelation of the UIP shock at 0.5. 
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( 1 1( / / ) /t t t t t tNFA A P e B P+ += + Y , where Y  is the steady state value of /
nom
t tY P , with 
nom
tY : 
Home nominal GDP; see Appendix.) 3 
Predicted standard deviations and mean values of these (and other) variables are 
shown, as well as impulse responses. The variables are quarterly. The statistics/responses for 
the domestic interest rate ( ti ) and tNFA  refer to differences of these variables from steady 
state values ( ti  is a quarterly rate expressed in fractional units), while statistics/responses for 
the remaining variables refer to relative deviations from steady state values. All 
statistics/responses are expressed in percentage terms. Results are presented for simulations in 
which the economy is subjected to just (Home and Foreign) productivity shocks  (see Cols. 
labeled "Shocks to ,θ θ ∗ ," and "Shocks to ϕ ,") and for simulations in which the economy is 
simultaneously subjected to productivity and UIP shocks (Cols. labeled "Shocks to , ,θ θ ϕ∗ ").  
 
3.1. Baseline AR(1) specification for UIP shocks 
Table 1a shows results for the model with the baseline AR(1) specification forUIP shocks 
(equation (29)), and a 10% steady state imports/GDP ratio. 
In that version of the model, the optimized response coefficients under cooperation 
(see Cols. (1)-(3)) are 10.61πΓ =  and 0.01yΓ = − . Thus, the optimized rule under cooperation 
has a strict anti-inflation stance, and the output response coefficient is close to zero. Under the 
optimized rule, nominal and real exchange rates are highly volatile. The main source of 
exchange rate movements are UIP shocks. Welfare under the optimized rule (with 
productivity and UIP shocks) is slightly higher than in the deterministic steady state 
( 0.008%ζ = ); UIP shocks have a slight negative effect on welfare: 0.006%ζ = −  when the 
economy is subjected just to UIP shocks.  
 Cols. (4)-(6) in Table 1a show results for a version of the model with flexible prices 
( 0d = ). The behavior of real variables in the sticky-prices economy (under the optimized 
rule) closely resembles the behavior under flexible prices (the flex-prices variant of the model 
uses the optimized policy rule derived under sticky prices). (Interestingly welfare is slightly 
lower under flexible prices: it appears that this is due to the fact that the volatility of asset 
stocks ( ,t tA B ) is somewhat higher under flexible pricesas a result of this, average bond-
transaction costs are slightly higher, and mean consumption is slightly lower, in the flex-
prices equilibrium).  
 Col. (7) reports results for the Nash outcome (under sticky prices). In the Nash 
equilibrium, the policy response coefficients are very similar to those generated under 
cooperation ( 8.50πΓ =  and 0.01yΓ = − ). As a result, the welfare and business cycle statistics 
are very similar under the two monetary policy arrangements.  
 Cols. (8)-(10) report results for a version of the (sticky-prices) model with a 
(symmetric) peg. When there are UIP shocks, welfare under the peg ( 0.14%)ζ = −  is 
markedly lower than under optimized policy, i.a. because UIP shocks induce high volatility of 
the domestic interest rate, under the peg. However, it seems plausible that a (credible) peg 
reduces the variance of UIP shocks (see Kollmann (2001)). The subsequent discussion is 
based on the assumption that the adoption of a peg eliminates the UIP shocks (i.e. drives their 
                                                 
3
 The Foreign real exchange rate is /( )t t t tRER P e P
∗ ∗
= , and the Foreign net foreign asset 
position is 1 1( /( ) / ) /t t t t t tNFA A e P B P
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
+ += + Y , where 
∗Y  is the steady state value of /nomt tY P
∗ ∗ , 
with nomtY
∗ : Foreign nominal GDP.  
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variance to zero). Under this assumption, the peg induces just slightly smaller welfare 
( 0.007)ζ =  than the optimized cooperative rule ( 0.008)ζ = .  
 
 Table 1b considers a variant of the sticky-prices model (with baseline AR(1) structure 
for UIP shocks), in which the steady state imports/GDP ratio is set at 40%. In that variant, 
the optimized rules under cooperation has a somewhat less strict anti-inflation stance 
( 2.91, 0.003)yπΓ = Γ = − . UIP shocks have a slightly stronger negative effect on welfare, but 
the welfare effect of these shocks remains small ( 0.019%ζ = − , under optimized rule), 
despite the significant (nominal and real) exchange rate volatility induced by these shocks 
(under optimized rule). A peg (that eliminates the UIP shocks) now induces higher welfare 
( 0.006%ζ = ) than the optimized float ( 0.016%ζ = − , with joint productivity and UIP 
shocks).  
 
3.2. Two-factor specification of UIP shocks 
A shortcoming of the baseline AR(1) specification of the UIP shocks, is that the predicted 
autocorrelation of the real exchange rate (about 0.5) is markedly lower than that that seen in 
the data (autocorrelation of linearly detrended log real exchange rate between U.S. and 
Europe, during post-Bretton Woods era: 0.99).  
 Tables 2a and 2b consider  a version of the model in which UIP shocks are governed 
by the 2-factor structure (30). In that version, the real exchange rate (under the optimized 
float) is more volatile (standard deviation: about 15%), and markedly more persistent 
(autocorrelation: about 0.8). The more persistent UIP shocks in Table 2 have a stronger 
negative effect on welfare (than the less persistent shocks in Table 1): 0.16%ζ = − , when the 
steady state imports/GDP ratio is 10%, and 0.30%ζ = − , when the steady state imports/GDP 
ratio is 40%. Accordingly, a peg (that eliminates the UIP shocks) now induces markedly 
higher welfare ( 0.006ζ = ) than the optimized float.  
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APPENDIX 
•UIP shocks and biased exchange rate forecasts 
Assume that (Home and Foreign) household beliefs at t about 1te +  are given by a probability 
density function, stf , that differs from the true pdf, tf , by a factor 1/ tϕ : 
1 1( , ) ( / , ) /
s
t t t t t tf e f e ϕ ϕ+ +Ω = Ω , where Ω  is any other random variable. The Home [Foreign] 
Euler equation for foreign currency bonds is then given by (20)  [(22)]. 
 
 
•  Estimation of λ  (see (23)) 
Up to a (log-)linear approximation, (16), (20), (23) imply 
1 1( / )/ ln( / ) 1t t t t t t t tr r B P E RER RERλ χ ϕ∗ ∗+ +− = − + + −! ! , where 1ln( / )t t t t tr i E P P+= −!  and 1ln( / )t t t t tr i E P P∗ ∗ ∗ ∗+= −!  
are expected domestic and world real interest rates, and /t t t tRER e P P
∗
=  is the real exchange 
rate. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) fit this equation to a panel of 21 OECD economies, 
using annualized % interest rates and net foreign assets (NFA) normalized by annual exports. 
Based on instrumental variables (allowing for country fixed-effects), estimates of about 3 are 
obtained for the coefficient of the normalized NFA (Table 7, Cols. 5-8). In terms of the 
relation between quarterly fractional interest rate differentials and NFA normalized by 
quarterly exports, this implies a coefficient λ =3/1600≅ 0.0019 (the value used in the 
simulations).  
 
•Price setting in the intermediate goods sector 
A domestic firm that gets to choose a new domestic price at date t sets that price at (see (8)):  
          
1
,
0
, ,
10
,
0
( ) ( , / )
( /( 1)) / ( /( 1))
( )
{ }
d
t t tt
d
t t t t t t
d
t tt
d Cov MC
p E MC
d E
τ τν τ
τ ττ
τ τ
τ τ τ τντ
τ
τ
ν ν λ ν ν
=∞
−
+ +=∞
=
+ + =∞
−=
+
=
Π Ξ Π
= − Π + −
Π Ξ
∑
∑
∑
            
               where 1 1, , ,
0
( ) ( )/ { }d dt t t t t t t td E d E
τ
ν τ ν τ
τ τ τ
τ
λ
=∞
− −
+ + +
=
= Π Ξ Π Ξ∑ ,     with ,
0
1t t
τ
τ
τ
λ
=∞
+
=
=∑ .             
( ( , )t t t tCov x y E xy E xE y≡ − : conditional covariance between x and y.) Hence, ,
d
t tp  equals a 
weighted average of expected future (detrended) marginal costs (multiplied by the steady state 
markup factor /( 1)ν ν− ), plus a weighted sum of (conditional) covariances between future 
marginal costs and , ( / )( / ) ( )
d d d
t t t t t t t tC C P P Q P
τ ν
τ τ τ τ τβ+ + + + +Ξ = .  ,( , / )dt t t tCov MC ττ τ+ +Ξ Π  (and, thus, ,dt tp ) 
is higher, the higher the covariance between /tMC
τ
τ+ Π   and date t τ+  demand for the 
product sold by the firm (that demand is proportional to ( )d dt tQ P
ν
τ τ+ + ; see (2)).  
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Table 1a. Baseline model (AR(1) UIP shocks), 10% imports/GDP ratio 
                             Cooperation:                                     Nash:                 Symmetric Peg 
            Sticky prices                  Flexible prices           Sticky prices      Sticky prices 
Shocks to:                      Shocks to:                   Shocks to:         Shocks to: 
       , ,θ θ ϕ∗     ,θ θ ∗      ϕ          , ,θ θ ϕ∗      ,θ θ ∗      ϕ          , ,θ θ ϕ∗            , ,θ θ ϕ∗     ,θ θ ∗      ϕ  
              (1)          (2)         (3)               (4)         (5)          (6)               (7)                      (8)          (9)        (10) 
Standard deviations (in %)  
Y  8.26 8.26 0.12 8.27 8.27 0.31 8.26  8.88 8.21 3.38 
C 8.03 8.04 0.21 8.06 8.02 0.75 8.04  8.52 8.00 2.91 
I 10.24 10.21 0.74 10.68 10.09 3.48 10.23  16.74 9.83 13.55 
Π  0.06 0.02 0.06 0.69 0.10 0.69 0.06  0.32 0.10 0.31 
dΠ  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02  0.40 0.12 0.38 
i 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.15 0.03 0.16  1.90 0.04 1.90 
e∆  7.15 1.05 7.07 6.98 1.04 6.90 7.14  0.00 0.00 0.00 
RER 6.89 1.80 6.65 5.60 1.59 5.37 6.88  2.05 0.90 1.84 
NFA 4.41 0.46 4.39 4.63 0.41 4.61 4.41  5.24 0.22 5.24 
A 2.07 0.22 2.05 2.17 0.19 2.16 2.07  2.46 0.10 2.45 
B 2.07 0.22 2.05 2.17 0.19 2.16 2.07  2.46 0.10 2.45 
dµ  0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03  3.94 0.71 3.87 
mµ  6.01 1.14 5.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00  3.94 0.71 3.87 
 
Means (in %) 
Y 0.38 0.35 0.03 0.38 0.35 0.03 0.38  0.36 0.34 0.02 
C       0.35     0.33     0.01 0.34 0.34 0.01 0.34  0.24 0.32 -0.08 
dQ  0.36 0.35 0.01 0.36 0.35 0.01 0.36  0.26 0.34 -0.08 
mQ  0.43 0.32 0.11 0.61 0.35 0.26 0.44  0.69 0.34 0.35 
L 0.03 -0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.00 0.03 0.03  0.04 -0.00 0.04 
K 0.45 0.40 0.04 0.45 0.40 0.04 0.45  0.43 0.39 0.04 
RER 0.23 0.02 0.22 0.15 0.01 0.14 0.23  0.02 0.00 0.02 
NFA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.02 0.00 -0.02 
A -4.42 -0.01 -4.41 -4.29 -0.01 -4.28 -4.42  -0.03 -0.00 -0.03 
B 4.42 0.01 4.41 4.29 0.01 4.28 4.42  0.03 0.00 0.03 
dµ  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.26 0.01 0.26 
mµ     0.11   0.03 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11  -0.10 0.01 -0.11 
 
First-order autocorrelations 
Y 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.54 0.99  0.90 0.99 0.33 
e∆  -0.24 -0.08 -0.25 -0.24 -0.08 -0.25 -0.24  --- --- --- 
RER  0.47 0.83 0.44 0.50 0.86 0.47 0.47  0.94 0.97 0.94 
 
Welfare (% equivalent variation in consumption) ζ  0.008 0.015 -0.006 0.001 0.018 -0.017 0.008  -0.141 0.007 -0.149 
mζ  0.332 0.338 -0.006 0.326 0.340 -0.014 0.332  0.221 0.328 -0.106 
vζ   -0.322 -0.322 -0.000 -0.324 -0.321 -0.003 -0.329  -0.362 -0.319 -0.042 
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Notes: θ : productivity; i ∗ : world interest rate; ϕ : UIP shock; P ∗ : world price level; Y: GDP; C: 
consumption; I: investment; Π : gross CPI (final good) inflation; dΠ : gross domestic PPI inflation; i: 
domestic nominal interest rate; e∆ : depreciation factor of nominal exchange rate; RER: real exchange 
rate; NFA: net foreign assets (expressed in units of foreign good and normalized by steady state GDP); 
dµ , xµ , mµ  : average markup factors of domestic intermediate goods producers in the domestic market 
and in the export markets, and of importers; dQ , xQ : domestic intermediate goods sold domestically 
and exported;: mQ  imports; L: hours worked; K: capital stock; ζ , mζ , vζ : welfare measures.  
   Standard deviations and means of i and NFA refer to differences from steady state values; 
statistics for the remaining variables refer to relative deviations from steady state values. All 
statistics have been multiplied by 100, i.e. expressed in percentage terms.  
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Table 1b. Other variants of sticky-prices model (AR(1) UIP shocks) 
                  40% Imports/GDP ratio 
          Cooperation:    Nash:    Peg 
        , ,θ θ ϕ∗     ϕ         , ,θ θ ϕ∗       ,θ θ ∗    
               (1)           (2)               (3)              (4)          
Standard deviations (in %)  
Y  8.24 0.59 8.24 8.20 
C 8.06 0.83 8.06 7.99 
I 10.49 2.99 10.51 9.76 
Π  0.25 0.24 0.25 0.02 
dΠ  0.07 0.01 0.07 0.12 
i 0.23 0.04 0.23 0.04 
e∆  6.99 6.91 6.99 0.00 
RER 6.00 5.88 6.00 0.20 
NFA18.80 18.77 18.82 0.22 
A 8.82 8.80 8.82 0.10 
B 8.82 8.80 8.82 0.10 
dµ  0.17 0.03 0.15 0.71 
mµ  5.88 5.75 5.88 0.71 
 
Means (in %) 
Y 0.48 0.59 0.48 0.34 
C 0.38 0.83 0.38 0.32 
dQ  0.39 0.04 0.39 0.33 
mQ  0.48 0.16 0.48 0.33 
L 0.12 0.12 0.12 -0.00 
K 0.58 0.19 0.58 0.389 
RER 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.00 
NFA 0.05 0.06 0.06 -0.00 
A -17.08 -17.06 -17.07 -0.00 
B 17.08 17.06 17.07 0.00 
dµ  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
mµ  0.09 0.06 0.09 0.01 
 
First-order autocorrelations 
Y 0.99 0.94 0.99 0.99 
e∆  -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.99 
RER 0.39 0.37 0.39 0.96 
 
Welfare (% equivalent variation in consumption) ζ  -0.016 -0.019 -0.016 0.006 
mζ  0.308 -0.016 0.308 0.326 
vζ  -0.324 -0.003 -0.324 -0.319 
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Table 2a. Baseline model; UIP shocks: two-factor structure; 10% imports/GDP ratio 
                             Cooperation:                                     Nash:                 Symmetric Peg 
            Sticky prices                  Flexible prices           Sticky prices      Sticky prices 
Shocks to:                      Shocks to:                   Shocks to:         Shocks to: 
       , ,θ θ ϕ∗     ,θ θ ∗      ϕ          , ,θ θ ϕ∗      ,θ θ ∗      ϕ          , ,θ θ ϕ∗            , ,θ θ ϕ∗     ,θ θ ∗      ϕ  
              (1)          (2)         (3)               (4)         (5)          (6)               (7)                      (8)          (9)        (10) 
Standard deviations (in %)  
Y  8.29 8.26 0.69 8.32 8.27 0.95 8.29  9.67 8.21 5.11 
C 8.12 8.03 1.18 8.25 8.02 1.93 8.12  9.48 8.00 5.08 
I 10.86 10.19 3.75 12.26 10.09 6.96 10.86  23.75 9.83 21.61 
Π  0.18 0.02 0.18 0.90 0.10 0.89 0.18  0.83 0.10 0.82 
dΠ  0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03  1.04 0.12 1.03 
i 0.16 0.16 0.02 0.17 0.17 0.04 0.16  1.82 0.04 1.82 
e∆  9.26 1.01 9.20 9.01 1.03 8.96 9.26  0.00 0.00 0.00 
RER14.97 1.74 14.86 13.01 1.59 12.91 14.97  8.26 0.90 8.21 
NFA26.54 0.45 26.53 26.97 0.41 26.97 26.54  28.22 0.22 28.21 
A 12.44 0.21 12.44 12.65 0.19 12.65 12.44  13.24 0.10 13.23 
B 12.44 0.21 12.44 12.65 0.19 12.65 12.44  13.24 0.10 13.23 
dµ  0.06 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06  5.96 0.71 5.92 
mµ  9.65 1.13 9.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.65  5.96 0.71 5.92 
 
Means (in %) 
Y 0.58 0.35 0.22 0.58 0.35 0.23 0.58  0.52 0.34 0.17 
C 0.31 0.33 -0.02 0.37 0.34 0.03 0.31  -0.10 0.32 -0.43 
dQ  0.42 0.35 0.07 0.44 0.35 0.08 0.42  -0.06 0.34 -0.40 
mQ  0.67 0.32 0.35 1.85 0.35 1.50 0.67  1.86 0.34 1.52 
L 0.23 -0.00 0.23 0.21 -0.00 0.21 0.23  0.27 -0.00 0.27 
K 0.62 0.40 0.22 0.69 0.40 0.28 0.63  0.47 0.39 0.08 
RER 1.12 0.01 1.10 0.84 0.01 0.83 1.12  0.34 0.00 0.33 
NFA -0.26 -0.00 -0.25 -0.31 -0.00 -0.30 -0.26  -0.46 -0.00 -0.46 
A -9.20 -0.01 -9.20 -8.94 -0.01 -8.93 -9.20  -0.52 -0.00 -0.52 
B 9.20 0.01 9.20 8.94 0.01 8.93 9.20  0.52 0.00 0.52 
dµ  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.85 0.01 5.92 
mµ  0.70 0.03 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.70  -0.27 0.01 5.92 
 
First-order autocorrelations 
Y 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.89 0.99  0.88 0.99 0.58 
e∆  -0.12 -0.08 -0.12 -0.12 -0.08 -0.12 -0.12  --- --- -0.48 
RER 0.81 0.83 0.81 0.84 0.86 0.84 0.81  0.98 0.97 0.98 
 
Welfare (% equivalent variation in consumption) ζ  -0.152 0.015 -0.167 -0.102 0.018 -0.120 -0.152  -0.720 0.007 -0.727 
mζ  0.178 0.338 -0.159 0.238 0.340 -0.101 0.178  -0.273 0.328 -0.599 
vζ  -0.329 -0.322 -0.007 -0.340 -0.321 -0.018 -0.329  -0.448 -0.319 -0.129 
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Table 2b. Other variants of sticky-prices model (UIP shocks: two-factor structure) 
                  40% Imports/GDP ratio 
          Cooperation:    Nash:    Peg 
        , ,θ θ ϕ∗     ϕ         , ,θ θ ϕ∗       ,θ θ ∗    
               (1)           (2)               (3)              (4)          
Standard deviations (in %)  
Y 8.53 2.29 8.53 8.20 
C 8.67 3.31 8.67 7.99 
I 14.89 11.04 14.89 9.76 
Π  0.54 0.53 0.54 0.02 
dΠ  0.15 0.08 0.15 0.12 
i 0.30 0.15 0.30 0.04 
e∆  8.23 8.18 8.23 0.00 
RER 8.81 8.76 8.81 0.20 
NFA76.62 76.61 76.62 0.22 
A 35.93 35.93 35.93 0.10 
B 35.93 35.93 35.93 0.10 
dµ  0.35 0.20 0.35 0.71 
mµ  8.40 8.33 8.40 0.71 
 
Means (in %) 
Y 0.96 0.62 0.96 0.34 
C 0.43 0.11 0.43 0.32 
dQ  0.59 0.24 0.59 0.33 
mQ  0.80 0.48 0.80 0.33 
L 0.59 0.59 0.59 -0.00 
K 1.15 0.76 1.15 0.39 
RER 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.00 
NFA -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
A -29.37 -29.38 -29.40 -0.00 
B 29.37 29.39 29.40 0.00 
dµ  0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
mµ  0.31 0.30 0.33 0.01 
  
First-order autocorrelations 
Y 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 
e∆  -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 --- 
RER 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.96 
 
Welfare (% equivalent variation in consumption) ζ  -0.306 -0.307 -0.306 0.006 
mζ  0.069 -0.252 0.069 0.326 
vζ  -0.375 -0.054 -0.375 -0.319 
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Table 3. Sticky-prices model, more persistent UIP shocks--parameters picked to match 
post-BW std & autocorr. of RER (AR(1) with 0.99 root; std of innovation: 0.268%); 
10% imports/GDP ratio 
          Cooperation:    Nash:    Peg 
        , ,θ θ ϕ∗     ϕ         , ,θ θ ϕ∗       ,θ θ ∗    
               (1)           (2)               (3)              (4)          
Standard deviations (in %)  
Y 8.33 1.07 8.33 8.21 
C 8.23 1.76 8.23 8.00 
I 10.58 2.81 10.58 9.83 
Π  0.13 0.13 0.13 0.10 
dΠ  0.02 0.00 0.03 0.12 
i 0.16 0.02 0.16 0.04 
e∆  4.56 4.44 4.56 0.00 
RER13.38 13.26 13.38 0.90 
NFA74.68 74.68 74.68 0.22 
A 35.02 35.02 35.02 0.10 
B 35.02 35.02 35.02 0.10 
dµ  0.04 0.00 0.05 0.71 
mµ  5.19 5.06 5.19 0.71 
 
Means (in %) 
Y 0.84 0.49 0.84 0.34 
C 0.34 0.00 0.34 0.32 
dQ  0.72 0.36 0.72 0.34 
mQ  1.26 0.93 1.26 0.34 
L 0.49 0.49 0.49 -0.00 
K 0.90 0.49 0.90 0.39 
RER 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.00 
NFA -2.27 -2.27 -2.27 -0.00 
A -5.03 -5.02 -5.03 -0.00 
B 5.03 5.02 5.03 0.00 
dµ  0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 
mµ  0.26 0.23 0.26 0.01 
 
First-order autocorrelations 
Y 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
e∆  -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 --- 
RER 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.97 
 
Welfare (% equivalent variation in consumption) ζ  -0.299 -0.314 -0.299 0.007 
mζ  0.038 -0.299 0.038 0.328 
vζ  -0.338 -0.015 -0.338 -0.319 
